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INSURANCE LAW
I. CONTINGENT BENEFICIARY OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CAN
COLLECT AFTER PRIMARY BENEFICIARY HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF
KILLING INSURED
In Lewis v. Lewis' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that section 21-1-50 of the South Carolina Code,2 which provides
that any insurance proceeds forfeited by the convicted killer of
the insured shall become the property of the deceased's estate,
does not preclude the operation of a life insurance contingent
beneficiary clause. This holding brings South Carolina in line
with the majority rule.
The insured in Lewis died intestate survived by her hus-
band, two daughters, and one son. The policy involved in the
suit named the insured's husband as primary beneficiary. The
insured's eldest daughter, petitioner in this action, was desig-
nated as contingent beneficiary. Since section 21-1-503 prevented
Mr. Lewis, who had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter
in the death of the insured, from collecting the proceeds of the
1. 281 S.C. 388, 315 S.E.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. This statute provides:
No person who shall be convicted in any court of competent jurisdiction of
unlawfully killing another person shall receive any benefit from the death of
the person unlawfully killed ... whether by way of intestate succession, will,
vested or contingent remainder, insurance or otherwise. The interest which
would otherwise devolve upon the person excluded from receiving any benefit
by the terms of this section shall vest in and become the property of the estate
of the person unlawfully killed. In case the offender is a parent of a child or
children who, if such parent were dead, would inherit from the deceased, such
child or children shall immediately take the interest in the estate of the de-
ceased which the offending parent would have taken except for the provisions
hereof.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-1-50 (1976).
3. This statute codified established South Carolina common law, which prohibited a
person from profiting from his or her wrong. See Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85
S.E.2d 576 (1955); Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S.C. 365, 371-72, 175 S.E. 545, 547 (1934); Smith
v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930); Karesh, Wills, 8 S.C.L. REV. 150, 151-53
(1955); Recent Cases, Inheritance - Unintentional Killing of Wife as a Bar to Right of
Inheritance, 7 S.C.L. REv. 475 (1955); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1529 (1930). This proposition
reflects the public policy of other jurisdictions as well. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3D
794 (1969).
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policy, the eldest daughter argued that as contingent beneficiary
she was entitled to all the proceeds.4
The other children contended that the proceeds should be
awarded to the estate in accordance with the literal wording of
section 21-1-50. They argued that as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, "'[f]ull effect must be given to each section of a stat-
ute, giving words their plain meaning, and in the absence of am-
biguity words must not be added or taken away.' "5 They
reasoned that to award the proceeds to the contingent benefi-
ciary would be in derogation of this admonition, because the sec-
ond sentence of the statute, requiring any forfeited interest to
"vest in and become the property of the estate,"6 would then be
effectively deleted. Respondents contended that such deletion
would contradict the legislative intent of the statute. They ar-
gued that since the drafters of the statute were undoubtedly
aware of the practice of naming contingent beneficiaries, but had
included no exceptions for such beneficiaries, the statute pre-
cluded contingent beneficiaries from exercising their claims."
The court, however, was not persuaded by this argument.
Finding no South Carolina case on point, the court adopted the
majority rule, which provides that forfeited proceeds should be
awarded to the contingent beneficiary, rather than to the estate."
The court of appeals, following the reasoning of courts in other
jurisdictions, 9 concluded that "the legislature did not intend to
cause a forfeiture of rights of an innocent contingent beneficiary,
and a policy provision naming a contingent beneficiary should
prevail even in the face of a statute which, by a strict applica-
tion of its terms, would appear to provide a forfeiture." 10 Under-
4. Respondent Robert Lee Lewis, Sr., the insured's husband, admitted that § 21-1-
50 prohibited his recovery of any life insurance proceeds, either as primary beneficiary or
as insured's heir. Id. at 390, 315 S.E.2d at 817.
5. Brief of Appellants at 3 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lindsay, 273
S.C. 79, 85, 254 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1979)).
6. S.C. COD ANN. § 21-1-50 (1976).
7. Brief of Respondent at 3.
8. See, e.g., Reynolds v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 591 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.
1979); Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952); Brown v.
Life Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Brooks v. Thompson, 521
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975). See also Annot., 26 A.L.R.2D 979 (1952). But see Beck v. Dow-
ney, 191 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1951), reafl'd, 198 F.2d 626 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952); Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P-2d 170 (Wyo. 1970).
9. See cases cited supra note 8.
10. 281 S.C. at 390-91, 315 S.E.2d at 817.
142 [Vol. 37
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INSURANCE LAW
lying the argument, perhaps, was the principle that absent a
clear-cut purpose that contravenes public policy, private provi-
sions governing the disposition of personal property and assets
should be honored.
Deborah Williamson Witt
II. MORTGAGOR'S NONPAYMENT DOES NOT DESTROY
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHTS UNDER FIRE INSURANCE POLICY
In Fort Hill Federal Savings and Loan Association v. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Co.," the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that the failure of the mortgagor to make
proper payment of the premium does not vitiate the mortgagee's
protection under a fire insurance policy. Nonpayment of the pre-
mium invalidates the mortgagee's interest in the policy only
upon failure to pay after demand is made to the mortgagee.
12
From the results of this decision, it might appear that South
Carolina accepts the majority rule that a standard mortgagee
clause 13 creates a distinct and independent insurance contract,
14
but this interpretation is not entirely correct.' 5 Instead, the
court reasoned that since the mortgagee's rights under the policy
are dependent upon the existence of the mortgagor's debt, there
cannot be total independence of the two parties. It follows,
therefore, that such fire insurance policies are bifurcated, with
"separate consideration clauses, separate cancellation clauses,
separate claim payment provisions, and a clause clearly antici-
pating situations of nonliability to the mortgagor and clear lia-
bility to the mortgagee."' 6
The dispute in this case arose from a complex chronology of
events. On August 25, 1979, the Johnstons 7 issued a check' 8 to
11. 281 S.C. 532, 316 S.E.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1984).
12. Id. at 535, 316 S.E.2d at 686.
13. A standard mortgagee clause is also known as a New York or union form clause.
14. 10A G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§
42:725, 42:728 (rev. 2d ed. 1982); 5A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3401-
07 (rev. ed. 1979).
15. 281 S.C. 537, 316 S.E.2d at 687.
16. Id.
17. In a separate action the court determined that the Johnstons, mortgagors-in-
sureds, did not have fire insurance coverage.
19851
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their local Farm Bureau agent for fire insurance coverage on
their Oconee County property.'9 On the same day the agent is-
sued an insurance binder to the Johnstons and sent a copy of
the binder, along with the check, to the Columbia Farm Bureau
office. Fort Hill Federal Savings and Loan Association was
named as loss-payee in the policy's standard mortgagee clause.20
On September 7, 1979, Mrs. Johnston requested that Farm Bu-
reau prepare and forward a certificate of coverage to Fort Hill.2'
The check to Farm Bureau was presented to the bank and
dishonored twice, 22 first on September 21, 1979, and again on
October 2, 1979. On October 5, 1979, after a routine investiga-
tion, Farm Bureau issued the policy, showing August 25, 1979, as
the inception date, and sent a certificate of coverage to Fort
Hill.23 Neither Farm Bureau nor Fort Hill knew at the time that
fire had destroyed the insured property on October 3, 1979.
Farm Bureau did not discover that the premium check had
been dishonored until October 11, 1979. The Johnstons never
paid the premium, and Farm Bureau never demanded payment
from Fort Hill.24 In early November 1979, Fort Hill prepared a
notice of cancellation, which listed August 25, 1979, as the can-
cellation date. The notice mailed to Fort Hill, however, indi-
18. The check was written in response to a letter from the local Farm Bureau agent,
dated August 10, 1979, advising the Johnstons that Farm Bureau would insure their
property and indicating the premium amount. Brief of Respondent at 2.
19. Colonial Penn Insurance Company had previously provided fire insurance cover-
age on the property. Brief of Respondent at 1-2. In early September Colonial Penn In-
surance Company notified Fort Hill that insurance coverage would be cancelled if the
overdue premium was not received within two weeks. In response to that notice, Fort
Hill sent a reminder of insurance obligations to the Johnstons.
20. 281 S.C. 534, 316 S.E.2d at 686.
21. Brief of Respondent Fort Hill at 3.
22. The Johnstons indicated that their sloppy bookkeeping was the cause of the
dishonored checks. Previously the Johnstons had transferred funds from one checking
account to another, but had failed to reconcile the check registers of each account to
reflect the transfers. Brief of Appellant at 4. Despite overdraft notification by the bank,
the Johnstons took no steps either to cover the check oi obtain alternative insurance
coverage. Id.
23. A dispute remained whether Farm Bureau sent the certification of coverage
before the October 3 fire. Farm Bureau records indicated that the computer run that
would have issued the policy was not made until October 5, two days after the fire, mak-
ing it impossible for Fort Hill to have received notice of coverage prior to the loss. In
contradiction, a Fort Hill employee testified that to the best of her knowledge the policy
was received by Fort Hill prior to September 23, 1979. Brief of Appellant at 3.
24. 281 S.C. at 534, 316 S.E.2d at 686.
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cated that the Johnstons' policy was in effect at the time of the
loss. The effective date of Fort Hill's cancellation was November
14, 1979, because the policy's mortgagee cancellation clause
stated that the policy would continue in force for the benefit
only of the mortgagee (or trustee) for ten days after notice to the
mortgagee (or trustee) of cancellation.25
The trial court found that while Farm Bureau was absolved
of liability to the Johnstons, Fort Hill's right under the policy
remained intact. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals found that since a mortgagee's rights under
a fire insurance policy are dependent upon the continuance of
the secured debt owed the mortgagee by the mortgagor, the
mortgagee cannot be independent of the mortgagor-insured. Be-
cause these rights cannot exist independently, the court con-
cluded that an independent contract is not created by the stan-
dard mortgagee clause.26 At the same time, however, the court
described the mortgagee's status as "so independent that no act
or neglect by the mortgagor can derogate this status. 27 This
language indicates that the court distinguished the majority rule
and the South Carolina rule by differentiating between rights
and status.
Courts in other jurisdictions have not drawn a distinction
between rights and status. It has generally been held that de-
spite the derivative status of the mortgagee's rights, these rights
constitute sufficient grounds upon which to base contracting sta-
tus. Therefore, the terms of the standard mortgagee clause de-
termine the insurer's liability to the mortgagee at the time of the
loss. 28 If the mortgagee has no interest in the property at the
time of loss, the standard mortgagee clause is invalid.29 Thus,
25. Id. at 535, 316 S.E.2d at 686.
26. Id. at 537, 316 S.E.2d at 687.
27. Id., 316 S.E.2d at 687-88.
28. 5A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 14, § 3401. See also Pacific Ins. Co. of New York v.
R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co., 114 Ga. 411, 151 S.E.2d 541 (1966); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v.
Penn. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 433, 157 S.E.2d 897 (1967), af/'d, 118 Ga. App.
655, 165 S.E.2d 309 (1968); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Associates Discount Corp., 116 Ga. App.
792, 159 S.E.2d 97 (1967); Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 106 Ga. App.
382, 127 S.E.2d 43 (1962); Hennessey v. Helgason, 168 Miss. 834, 151 So. 724 (1934);
Bacot v. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 96 Miss. 223, 50 So. 729 (1909); Zeiger v. Farmers'
& Laborers' Coop. Ins. Ass'n, 358 Mo. 353, 214 S.W.2d 426 (1948).
29. 5A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 14, § 3401. See also Jeromev. Great Am. Ins. Co., 52
N.C. App. 573, 279 S.E.2d 42 (1981); Third Nat'l Co. v. Thompson, 28 Tenn. App. 436,
1985]
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the effectiveness of the clause is conditioned upon the continu-
ance of debt.
The court of appeals did not reveal the basis for drawing a
distinction between rights and status. Moreover, the court read-
ily admitted that while it might have journeyed a slightly differ-
ent path, it arrived at the same result as courts following the
majority rule. Perhaps the court was reluctant to adopt the ma-
jority rule because the resolution of this controversy did not re-
quire so broad an expansion of existing South Carolina law.
In Fort Hill the court of appeals declined to embrace the
majority rule that a separate contract exists between the mort-
gagee and the insurer whenever a standard mortgagee clause is
included in a policy insuring mortgaged property. Instead, the
court, acknowledged the unique status of a mortgagee, but con-
sidered this uniqueness an insufficient basis for finding a sepa-
rate contract.3 0
Deborah Williamson Witt
III. STACKING OF INSURANCE COVERAGES
A. Stacking of Insurance Benefits Limited
In Busby v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.31 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled on the question
of whether basic personal injury protection (PIP) benefits of
several automobile insurance policies could be stacked. 2 The
court held that statutory provisions in the South Carolina Code
expressly prohibit the stacking of basic PIP benefits.33
This case arose out of an automobile accident in which the
191 S.W.2d 190 (1945).
30. On the second issue presented in Fort Hill, the court held that the mortgagee's
alleged lack of knowledge of the fire insurance contract did not negate Farm Bureau's
liability to the mortgagee. 281 S.C. at 540, 316 S.E.2d at 689 (citing Annot., 132 A.L.R.
355 (1941)).
31. 280 S.C. 330, 312 S.E.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1984), reh'g denied, No. 0037 (filed Feb.
8, 1934).
32. The term "stacked" or "stacking" was used by the court to mean "the adding of
insurance benefits provided by separate insurance coverages, whether by different or the
same insurance companies or policies of insurance." Id. at 331 n.1, 312 S.E.2d at 717 n.1.
33. Id. at 331, 312 S.E.2d at 717.
[Vol. 37
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respondent, Nellie W. Busby, was injured while driving a rented
car. The rental car was insured with a policy providing basic PIP
for its occupants in the amount of $1,000, the minimum required
under section 56-11-110 of the South Carolina Code. 4 At the
time of the accident Busby also had an insurance policy with
State Farm that provided $1,000 basic PIP coverage on her per-
sonal automobile.
Because her medical expenses arising from the accident
were more than $2,000, Busby attempted to collect the basic
PIP benefits from both insurance policies. She collected $1,000
in basic PIP benefits from the insurer of the rental car, but
State Farm refused to pay her the $1,000 that would result from
the stacking of her policy's basic PIP coverage with that of the
rental company's policy. Busby filed suit to collect the addi-
tional $1,000 from State Farm and the trial court ruled in her
favor. The court of appeals reversed that order, holding that sec-
tion 56-11-150 of the South Carolina Code "expressly prohibits
the stacking of basic PIP benefits provided by section 56-11-
110.,,35
In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the language
of section 56-11-15036 and its relationship to the amended sec-
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976). At the time of enactment, the 1976 Code of
Laws of South Carolina required that each insurance carrier offer minimum medical,
hospital, and disability benefits in each policy of automobile liability insurance issued,
delivered, sold, or renewed in South Carolina. The policyholder was required to purchase
this basic PIP coverage. Section 56-11-110 provided in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, no policy or contract (herein-
after referred to as a policy) of liability insurance as defined in Article 7 of
Chapter 9 or other security as provided for in § 56-11-210 shall be issued, de-
livered, sold or renewed in this State after October 1, 1974, unless such policy
also affords the minimum medical, hospital and disability benefits set forth
herein .... The minimum medical, hospital and disability benefits shall in-
clude up to an amount of one thousand dollars per person for payment of all
reasonable expenses arising from the accident and sustained within three years
from the date thereof for necessary medical, surgical, chiropractic, X-ray and
dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospi-
tal, professional nursing and funeral services ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (1976). The 1978 amendment altered this section to make the
benefits optional to the insured, and the 1979 amendment states: "The insured's option
shall include that of rejecting either or both of the foregoing described benefit cover-
ages." S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-110 (Supp. 1984).
35. 280 S.C. at 337, 312 S.E.2d at 720.
36. This Section provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no person shall
recover benefits under the coverages required in § 56-11-110 from more than
7
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tion 56-11-110. The first three subsections of section 56-11-150
deal with the stacking of basic PIP benefits. Subsection (a) pro-
hibits the payment of duplicate or supplemental benefits under
two policies or from two insurers; subsection (b) requires that
the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident provide
coverage for a person injured while occupying that motor vehi-
cle; and subsection (c) enables a person injured while not in his
own car to collect basic PIP benefits under his own policy only if
there is no basic PIP coverage in effect for the motor vehicle
involved in the accident.3 7 The court concluded from those pro-
visions that "it is the obvious intent of the legislature not to al-
low stacking of basic PIP benefits." 38
The court expressly rejected Busby's argument that because
of the 1978 amendment to section 56-11-110, section 56-11-150
was not applicable in this case. The 1978 amendment trans-
formed basic PIP from mandatory to optional coverage. Busby
contended that because her basic PIP coverage was not required
by statute, it was not subject to the prohibitions of section 56-
11-150. 39
The court examined the two code sections and their respec-
tive amendments to determine "whether, when the legislature
said in section 56-11-150 that the benefits 'required' by section
56-11-110 could not be stacked, it meant 'required to be pur-
chased by the insured' as the trial judge held, or 'required to be
provided by the insurer' as State Farm contend[ed]."'40 Since
both sections were originally enacted as part of the Automobile
one such policy of liability insurance or insurer on either a duplicate or supple-
mental basis.
(b) As to any person injured in an accident while occupying a motor vehi-
cle for which the coverage required by § 56-11-110 is in effect, and as to any
person injured as a pedestrian by such a motor vehicle, the benefits shall be
payable by the insurer of the motor vehicle.
(c) As to any person insured under a policy providing the coverage re-
quired by § 56-11-110 who is injured in an accident v'hile occupying or struck
as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle for which such coverage is not in effect, the
benefits shall be payable by the injured party's insurer providing such
coverage.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-150 (1976).
37. 280 S.C. at 331, 312 S.E.2d at 717.
38. Id.
39. Brief of Respondent at 2. See also 280 S.C. at 332, 312 S.E.2d at 717-18.
40. 280 S.C. at 333, 312 S.E.2d at 718.
[Vol. 37
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Reparation Reform Act of 1974,41 the purpose of the Act was
examined to determine the legislative intent. Section 56-11-2042
states that the purpose of the Act "is to require medical, surgi-
cal, funeral, and disability insurance benefits to be provided
without regard to fault under motor vehicle policies that provide
bodily injury and property damage liability insurance ....
Since the language of this section makes no distinction between
the mandatory basic PIP coverage and the optional additional
PIP coverage (APIP)," the court reasoned that the coverages
should be offered by insurance companies and concluded that
"'require' refers to a requirement placed on the insurer not the
insured.
'45
As previously noted, section 56-11-110 was amended in 1978
so that basic PIP coverage, like the APIP benefits under section
56-11-120, became optional with the insured. Section 56-11-150
prohibits the stacking of the basic PIP benefits that the old sec-
tion 56-11-110 had required the insurer to provide and the in-
sured to purchase. Section 56-11-150 does not prohibit the
stacking of APIP benefits that the insurer is required to provide
at the option of the insured. The court refused, however, to fol-
low a doctrine of repeal by implication 46 and stated that section
56-11-150 "continues to prohibit stacking of basic PIP
benefits.
'47
The court of appeals also examined the two South Carolina
Supreme Court cases on which the trial court relied in its deci-
sion. In Belk v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.48 the court
held that the optional APIP benefits prescribed by section 56-
11-120 could be stacked since section 56-11-150 prohibited the
41. The Act was codified as Chapter 11 of Title 56 of the South Carolina Code.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-11-20 (1976).
43. Id.
44. § 56-11-120 has provided, from the time it was first enacted, for APIP to be
made available at the option of the insured.
45. 280 S.C. at 333, 312 S.E.2d at 718.
46. The court quoted Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S.C. 66, 70, 173 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1970):
"'It is, of course, well settled that repeal by implication is not favored, and a law should
not be construed as impliedly repealing a prior law unless no other reasonable construc-
tion can be applied.'" 280 S.C. at 334-335, 312 S.E.2d at 719.
47. 280 S.C. at 337, 312 S.E.2d at 720. The court observed, "When the legislature
made basic PIP coverage optional with the insured, it could have repealed section 56-11-
150, thereby allowing such benefits to be stacked, but it did not."
48. 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978).
1985] 149
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payment of duplicate basic PIP benefits, not APIP benefits. The
lower court in Busby cited Belk for its holding that stacking is
limited by section 56-11-150 only when the insured is required
to purchase the coverage. 49 The court of appeals, however, was
not persuaded that stacking should be permitted for the now op-
tional 56-11-110 PIP coverage, since "[e]ven though section 56-
11-110 was amended after Belk, section 56-11-150 prohibiting
the stacking of basic PIP benefits was not repealed." 50
The South Carolina Supreme Court again considered the
stacking of APIP benefits in Esler v. United States Automobile
Association.51 The Esler court addressed the question of
"[w]hether an insured who contracted for two APIP coverages
could recover from both for injuries received in a motor vehicle
collision. '52 Relying on Belk, the court found that the stacking
of APIP benefits would be allowed.5 3 A test was formulated
which focused on "the number of additional coverages which
were separately contracted and paid for," rather than the num-
ber of policies issued.54 The court concluded that the insured
had contracted and paid for additional protection in the form of
APIP coverage on two cars and should, therefore, be permitted
to stack APIP coverage in order to recover the benefit of his
bargain. 5
Busby argued that although "[t]he Appellant [State Farm]
states that the 'respondent did in fact enjoy the benefit of her
bargain in the protection that she had at all times [when] she
drove her own automobile,' . . . Esler . . .makes no such dis-
tinction; the claim for insurance coverage rests upon the insur-
ance benefits that were paid for by an insured and that are not
49. Brief of Appellant at 7.
50. 280 S.C. at 335-336, 312 S.E.2d at 719.
51. 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979).
52. 273 S.C. at 261, 255 S.E.2d at 678.
53. The Esler court stated:
In Belk, we permitted an insured to recover APIP benefits from two policies
where two premiums were paid. We, at the same time, denied the right to
stack basic PIP benefits in such case because specific statutory language pro-
hibited it. Stacking was permitted, however, in the case of additional optional
PIP benefits because there was no prohibitory statutory language and two pre-
miums were paid.
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clearly prohibited by statute. '56 The court of appeals, however,
was apparently more persuaded by the prohibition of section 56-
11-150 and the distinction drawn between mandatory PIP and
optional APIP benefits. Even though PIP coverage is no longer
mandatory, because there was no express repeal of section 56-
11-150 the court concluded that Esler did not support the stack-
ing of basic PIP benefits.
The court of appeals denied a petition for a rehearing of
Busby v. State Farm5" in which Busby argued that the supreme
court decision in Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance Cos.,59 al-
lowing the stacking of underinsured motorist coverage, should
apply in this case to permit the stacking of PIP benefits. The
court distinguished Gambrell, finding that while underinsured
coverage and basic PIP coverage are both offered at the option
of the insured, the stacking of basic PIP coverage is prohibited
without exception under section 56-11-150.
The holding in Busby, prohibiting stacking of basic PIP
coverage, seems to signal a departure from the line of cases de-
cided by the supreme court that allowed stacking of underin-
sured motorist coverage6" and liability coverage.6 1 Although
these cases involved statutory interpretation, the supreme court
used the Esler "benefit of the bargain" test to find that the in-
sureds could stack various coverages that were not expressly
prohibited by statute.
Paul B. Lindemann
56. Brief of Respondent at 5 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 11).
57. 280 S.C. at 336, 312 S.E.2d at 720.
58. Busby v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 0037 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 8,
1984).
59. 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983). For a discussion of Gambrell, see Business
and Insurance Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 36 S.CL. REv. 1, 23-30
(1984).
60. See, e.g., Gambrell, 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814.
61. See, e.g., Kraft v. Hartford Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 257, 305 S.E.2d 243 (1983). For a
discussion of Kraft, see Business and Insurance Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 36 S.C.L. REv. 1, 30 (1984).
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B. Underinsurance Provisions of the South Carolina Code
Interpreted
Through its responses to certified questions presented in
Garris v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. 62 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court further clarified the underinsurance provisions of
section 56-9-8316s of the South Carolina Code. The court had
previously interpreted these underinsurance provisions in Gam-
brell v. Travelers Insurance Companies.
6 4
In Garris the decedents, Roderick Huntley and Thomas
Garris, the driver and passenger respectively, were riding in a
truck owned by their employer Bryce Mechanical Contractors
(Bryce). Huntley and Garris were killed when a vehicle driven
by David Turner crossed the center line and collided with the
truck.
All parties involved in the accident possessed automobile li-
ability insurance. Turner, the at fault motorist, had a policy pro-
viding the minimum statutory coverage of 15,000/30,000/5,000
(15/30/5). His coverage was, however, inadequate to cover all
damages sustained by the plaintiffs. Garris' policy, issued by All-
state, provided coverage for four vehicles. Huntley's policy, is-
sued by State Automobile Mutual Insurance, provided coverage
for two vehicles. The Bryce truck was insured by Cincinnati In-
surance Company (Cincinnati) under a policy that provided cov-
erage for seventeen vehicles.6 5 A separate premium was paid for
62. 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984).
63. This section provides regarding underinsurance:
Such carriers shall also offer, at the option of the insured, underinsured motor-
ist coverage up to the limits of the insured's liability coverage to provide cover-
age in the event that damages are sustained in excess of the liability limits
carried by an at fault insured or underinsured motorist. If, however, an insured
or named insured is protected by uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage
in excess of the basic limits, the policy shall provide that the insured or named
insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle
involved in the accident. If none of the insured's or name insured's vehicles is
involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on
any one of the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage. Coverage on
any other vehicles shall not be added to that coverage.
S.C. COD ANN. § 56-9-931 (Supp. 1984).
64. 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983). For a discussion of Gambrell, see Business
and Insurance Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 36 S.CL. REy. 1, 23-30
(1984).
65. 280 S.C. at 152, 311 S.E.2d at 725.
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each vehicle.
The decedents and Bryce had discussed underinsurance
with their agents. Each agent explained the operation of under-
insurance in accordance with the terms of the South Carolina
Department of Insurance Interpretive Bulletin No. 6-78.6e Rely-
ing on this erroneous interpretation, the defendant insurers rea-
soned that underinsurance in the basic limits (15/30/5) would be
meaningless; 67 therefore, they offered the decedents and Bryce
coverage only in excess of the basic limits."8 The insureds elected
not to purchase the coverage as offered. 9
Following the accident, the estates of Roderick Huntley and
Thomas Garris brought declaratory judgment actions in the
United States District Court of South Carolina.70 The plaintiffs
sought an order requiring that underinsurance coverage be in-
cluded in the policy by law.7 1 Citing Belk v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.7 2 and Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,"3 the plaintiffs argued that if the minimum statu-
tory coverage is not offered to the insured the court should read
66. Brief of Defendants at 3. In its interpretive bulletin the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Insurance defined an underinsured vehicle as "one which is insured but for a
limit less than the [underinsurance coverage] limit purchased by the insured." Brief of
Defendants, Exhibit 1. This interpretation indicated that underinsurance would become
operative only if the insured's underinsurance coverage exceeded the liability limits of
the at fault motorist. The supreme court in Gambrell stated that this interpretation was
erroneous. 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 816-17. The court repeated this point in Garris,
280 S.C. at 153, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
67. See generally Brief of Defendants at 13-14.
68. 280 S.C. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
69. Brief of Defendants at 3.
70. 280 S.C. at 151-52, 311 S.E.2d at 725. Pursuant to Rule 46 of the Rules of Prac-
tice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, three questions were certified to the supreme
court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
71. Brief of Plaintiffs at 4.
72. 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978). The supreme court stated in Belk that if the
policy fails to provide the minimum protection required by statute, the court will inter-
pret the policy to include the minimum coverage.
73. 156 Ga. App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980),reu'd on other grounds, 104 Ga. App.
885, 890, 300 S.E.2d 166, 170 (1982)(case reversed only on issue of requirement of multi-
ple signatures). The plaintiff in Jones contended that his insurer failed to inform him of
optional coverages available under his no-fault policy. The Georgia court held that if the
insurer failed to prove notice of the optional coverages, these coverages, required to be
offered by statute, would constitute part of a continuing offer to the insured. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff could accept the offer by paying the applicable premiums and then
enforce the contract.
13
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such coverage into the policy.7 4 They reasoned that such refor-
mation was appropriate in Garris because section 56-9-831 re-
quired the insurers to offer underinsurance coverage within the
basic limits and they had neglected to do so.
Responding to the first certified question, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court defined underinsurance by stating that
"[tihe language of the statute clearly indicates underinsured mo-
torist coverage is optional coverage provided by an automobile
insurance carrier for instances where damages are sustained by
an insured in excess of the liability limits of the at fault
driver."70 The court rejected the defendants' argument that un-
derinsurance benefits may be offset by the amount of damages
received from the at fault motorist.76 Relying on its decision in
Ferguson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
7
7
the court concluded that allowance of such a deduction would be
contrary to public policy.7 8 Therefore, the insured's recovery of
benefits from his insurer is in addition to any damages received
from the at fault motorist.7 9 The total recovery, however, may
not exceed the damages sustained.80
The second question presented to the court was whether
section 56-9-831 required insurers to offer underinsurance cover-
age ranging from the basic limits of 15/30/5 up to the insured's
liability limits. The court answered affirmatively, stating that
because no offset is allowed, "underinsured coverage in any
amount up to insured's liability coverages must be offered to a
policyholder."81 The defendants in Garris had only offered the
decedents underinsurance in excess of the basic limits.
The last question considered by the court was whether, as-
74. Brief of Plaintiffs at 15.
75. 280 S.C. at 153, 311 S.E.2d at 725-26.
76. Id. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
77. 261 S.C. 96, 198 S.E.2d 522 (1973). In Ferguson the court held that an insurance
provision that allowed the amount paid under an uninsured motorist coverage provision
to be offset by the amount paid or payable under workmen's compensation law was ille-
gal, contrary to public policy, and, therefore, void. The court reasoned that the effect of
such a provision was to reduce the coverage below that required by statute. Conse-
quently, the reduction provision violated public policy. In Garris the court acknowledged
that underinsurance, unlike the uninsured coverage in Ferguson, was not mandatory.
Nevertheless, it stated that the public policy grounds justified denial of an offset.
78. 280 S.C. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 155, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
81. Id. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
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suming the insurer is obliged to offer underinsurance in the ba-
sic limits of 15/30/5, the plaintiff could stack the coverage on
each of the vehicles insured by each defendant's policy. Noting
that the question presupposed that basic limits underinsurance
coverage equals 15/30/5, the court stated that there is no re-
quired minimum or basic limits for underinsurance.82 Neverthe-
less, the court recited the general rule that if the statute creating
the coverage does not prohibit stacking in the situation under
inquiry, stacking is permissible.8 3 Citing Gambrell, the court ob-
served that there are two exceptions to stacking contained in
section 56-9-831. First, underinsurance maintained in excess of
the 15/30/5 limits may not be stacked. 4 Second, the insured
may not stack coverages if his vehicle is not involved in the acci-
dent.8 5 The court then injected a third general limitation on
stacking, stating that the claimant must be within the class con-
sisting of the named insured, his spouse, and relatives residing
in the insured's household.86 Persons within this class are in-
sureds as to all vehicles under the policy. 7 The second class of
insureds consists of persons using the insured's vehicle(s) with
his consent and guest riders.88 These persons are insureds "only
with respect to the vehicle in which they are riding."89 The court
found that the plaintiff's decedents were within this latter class.
Therefore, they were insureds only as to the Bryce truck in-
volved in the accident and could not stack coverages of Bryce's
sixteen other vehicles under the Cincinnati policy. The plaintiffs
were not allowed to stack coverages under the decedents' indi-
vidual policies because the decedents' vehicles were not involved
82. Id. at 155, 311 S.E.2d at 727.
83. This rationale is consistent with that advanced by the court in other stacking
cases. See, e.g., Busby v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 S.C. at 336-37, 312 S.E.2d
at 719-20. The defendant based his contention that stacking was impermissible under all
circumstances on the court's decision in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bair, 257 S.C. 551,
186 S.E.2d 410 (1972). The court in Bair held that uninsured motorist coverage could not
be stacked. In Garris the court stated that the question of whether uninsured coverage
may be stacked could be answered affirmatively if the issue arises again since § 56-9-831
was enacted after the decision in Bair.
84. 280 S.C. at 155, 311 S.E.2d at 727.
85. Id.
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in the accident.90 The statute provides that under these circum-
stances, recovery is limited to the amount of underinsurance
coverage on any one of the insured's vehicles."' Moreover, sec-
tion 56-9-831 states that "coverage on any other vehicle shall not
be added to that coverage." '92 Consequently, the plaintiffs could
recover underinsurance benefits from the coverage on only one
vehicle.
0 3
The defendants in Garris admitted that they only offered
coverage in excess of 15/30/5, and this was substantiated by a
copy of the policy.9 4 As a result, the court was not called upon to
determine which party has the burden of proving that the op-
tional coverage was not offered. Courts in other jurisdictions
have held that the insurer has the burden of proof on this
issue.
9 5
In addition to the proof issue, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's responses leave other questions unanswered. The court
did not identify the appropriate remedy for the defendant's fail-
ure to offer optional coverages. The plaintiff in Garris contended
that reformation was appropriate. The South Carolina courts,
however, have not previously written optional coverage into a
policy.00 Nevertheless, one could argue that by disallowing the
offset in Garris the court indicated that coverage required to be
offered is to be treated as if it were mandatory and that optional





94. Brief of Plaintiffs, Exhibit 1.
95. See Flewellen v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983); Jones
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980); Holman v.
All Nation Ins. Co. 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980).
96. But see Belk v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978); Jordan
v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 294, 214 S.E.2d 818 (1975); Williams v. Pennsylvania
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 396, 143 S.E.2d 797 (1965)(all stating that statutorily man-
dated coverage will be written into a policy if not included by the insurer).
97. As persuasive authority for this proposition, a claimant could cite Jones v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 230, 274 S.E.2d 623 (1980); Flewellen v. Atlanta
Casualty Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983); Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288
N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980). For the holding in Jones, see supra note 12. In Flewellen the
Georgia Supreme Court held that when the insured failed to make the mandatory offer,
the policy provided at its inception the $50,000 personal injury protection that the stat-
ute required the insurer to offer. Upon payment of the additional premium due and
filing of the proof of loss the insured was entitled to demand and receive $50,000 cover-
[Vol. 37
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that reformation or inclusion is the appropriate remedy, the
South Carolina Supreme Court's statement that there is no re-
quired minimum for underinsurance raises uncertainty as to the
amount of coverage that could be inserted by law.
Garris serves as a warning to insurers that they have an af-
firmative obligation to offer and correctly explain underin-
surance coverage to the policyholder. Most important the
court's decision raises the possibility that the insured may be
entitled to postaccident underinsurance coverage if the insurer
neglects to offer or incorrectly explains underinsurance to the
policyholder.
Tammie E. White
C. Stacking Under a Single Limit Policy
On an issue of first impression, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Howard"'
that a $35,000 "single limit" uninsured motorist policy does not
constitute coverage in excess of the "basic limits," as defined in
section 56-9-820 of the South Carolina Code,"" when the policy
does not provide for more than $35,000 of total coverage. 10 0 The
age. The court indicated that this remedy was not the equivalent of reformation. In
Holman the plaintiff told the agent that he wanted to spend as little as possible on
insurance. Therefore, the agent did not explain or offer the available optional coverages,
which included underinsurance. The court held that because the offer was mandated by
statute, the coverages were implied by law in the insured's policy. Moreover, stacking
was allowed. Although the court stated that as a matter of "commercial courtesy" the
insured should pay a modest amount in premiums, it did not demand that the insured
do so. For a brief discussion of Holman, see Business and Insurance Law, Annual Sur-
vey of South Carolina Law, 36 S.C.L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1984).
98. 284 S.C. 17, 324 S.E.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. granted, - S.C. -, 329
S.E.2d 768 (1985).
99. S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976) sets the statutory minimum for liability cover-
age at $15,000 for bodily injury to or the death of one person in any one accident,
$30,000 for bodily injury to or the death of two or more persons in any one accident, and
$5,000 for injury to or destruction of property of another in any one accident. S. C. CODE
ANN. § 56-9-830 (1976) requires that each liability insurance policy issued contain an
uninsured motorist provision with no less than the basic limits set out in § 56-9-820.
100. 284 S.C. at 19, 324 S.E.2d at 324. In two previous decisions, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that basic limits under a split limit policy are 15,000/30,000/5,000.
Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984); Gambrell v. Travelers
Ins. Cos., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983). For a discussion of Garris, see supra notes
62-97 and accompaning text. For a discussion of Gambrell, see Business and Insurance
17
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court further held that under a single limit policy an insured
may "stack"'1 1 each of his uninsured motorist policies in full.
10 2
Gene Lindsey Howard, the insured, was seriously injured
when an unidentified motorist hit his vehicle. Two of his vehi-
cles, including the one involved in the accident, were covered by
a policy with respondent Northland Insurance Company that
provided uninsured motorist coverage of $15,000 for one person
and $30,000 per accident. Three of Howard's other vehicles were
covered by separate Nationwide policies containing "single
limit"'0 3 uninsured motorist endorsements of $35,000. Howard
recovered a $500,000 judgment against the unidentified, and
therefore uninsured, motorist in a John Doe action. Appellant
Nationwide then brought this action for a declaratory judgment
to determine the amount of uninsured motorist coverage it owed
respondent Howard. The trial court found that Howard could
add, or "stack," the coverage provided by each of his three sepa-
Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 36 S.C.L. REV. 1, 23 (1984).
101. "Stacking" occurs when an insured who has more than one type of insurance
coverage for injuries sustained in a specified type of accident sustains the type of injury
covered and seeks to recover under each of the applicable policies. 7 Am. JuR. 2D Auto-
mobile Insurance § 326 (1980). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bair, 257 S.C. 551,
554 n. 1, 186 S.E.2d 410, 411 n. 1 (1972). Unless precluded by statute or by a valid "other
insurance" or "set off" clause, stacking is generally permissible to the extent necessary to
allow the injured person to fully recover his damages, but no more than his damages. 7
AM. Jun. 2D Automobile Insurance § 326 (1980). Additionally, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court stated in Esler v. United States Auto. Ass'n., 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676
(1979), that the dominant reason for allowing stacking is to give the insured the "benefit
of his bargain" by allowing him to recover from more than one policy when he has paid
multiple premiums for additional uninsured motorist protection. For further discussion
of stacking, see 7 AM. Ju. 2D Automobile Insurance §§ 326-29 (1980); 8C J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTICE §§ 5101-10 (1981).
102. 284 S.C. at 20, 324 S.E.2d at 324. There is no doubt that stacking is allowed in
South Carolina under S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1984). See Garris v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 155, 311 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1984); Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Cos.,
280 S.C. 69, 73, 310 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1983).
103. A "single limit" insurance policy is one in which the insurance company pro-
vides a specified amount of insurance for each accident regardless of the number of per-
sons injured. A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 2.36, (1969 &
Supp. 1981). Under this coverage one person may recover up to the single limit specified
in the policy. The "single limit" policy should be contrasted with the more typical "split
limit" policy, which provides a certain amount of insurance for each individual who may
be injured and another amount for each accident regardless of how many are injured. Id.
S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (Supp. 1984) seems to accommodate the "split limit" policy,
permitting a single person injured in an accident to recover only $15,000 from a "split
limit" "15/30/5" policy.
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rate Nationwide policies. The court of appeals affirmed." 4
The court of appeals began its discussion in Howard by
stating that "stacking will be allowed if the insured is not pro-
tected in excess of the basic limits." 10 5 In response to Nation-
wide's argument that the "basic limit" under section 56-9-820
was a maximum of $15,000 for injuries to a single person, the
court observed that the South Carolina Supreme Court had re-
ferred to the "basic limits" as "15/30/5," but had never explic-
itly defined "basic limits."'1 6 The court further noted that this
case was unique because the South Carolina courts had never
before been asked to determine whether a "single limit" policy
of $35,000 exceeded the "basic limits" referred to in section 56-
9-831.107
The court concluded that "the basic statutory limit in
South Carolina is $35,000,"101s relying on Guthrie v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'09 In Guthrie a South Caro-
lina federal district court held that a motorist with a $25,000
single limit endorsement was uninsured under the Virginia unin-
sured motorist statute, which required a minimum coverage of
$15,000 per person or $30,000 per accident. 0 Citing Guthrie for
the proposition that uninsured motorist statutes "should be lib-
erally construed in favor of the injured party," the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's holding
that the "basic limits" in South Carolina should be $35,000,
since the South Carolina uninsured motorist statute provides
$5,000 coverage for property damage in addition to a total of
$30,000 for personal injuries."
The court's finding that the "single limit" policy did not ex-
ceed the "basic limits" enabled Howard to stack the three Na-
tionwide uninsured motorist policies pursuant to section 56-9-
831 of the South Carolina Code," 2 which allows stacking of cov-
104. Id. at 18, 324 S.E.2d at 323-24. The South Carolina Supreme Court has granted
Nationwide's request for certiorari and will hear arguments on the case in October 1985.
105. 284 S.C. at 18, 324 S.E.2d at 324. See supra note 102.
106. Id. at 19 n.1, 324 S.E.2d at 324 n.1.
107. Id., 324 S.E.2d at 324.
108. Id.
109. 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1968).
110. Id. at 841.
111. 284 S.C. at 19, 324 S.E.2d at 324. See also S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976).
112. See supra note 102.
1985]
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erage that does not exceed the basic limits. The court noted,
however, that the extent to which a "single limit" insurance pol-
icy could be stacked was also a novel issue in South Carolina.
Nationwide argued that stacking should be allowed only to the
extent of $15,000 per policy, the amount of coverage allowed
under section 56-9-820 for injuries to a single person. The court
of appeals, however, again agreed with the trial court and held
that the single limit policies should be stacked in full "because
they contain no breakdown like the $15,000 and $30,000 poli-
cies." 113 Thus, Howard was able to stack his three $35,000 single
limit policies on his $15,000 split limit policy, for a total recov-
ery of $120,000.
While sound policy justifications exist for the result in How-
ard, the court could have relied on stronger authority than
Guthrie. Although the court correctly stated that the $25,000
single limit policy in Guthrie fell below the Virginia statutory
minimums of $15,000 per person or $30,000 per accident, the
court did not mention that more than one person was injured in
Guthrie, and thus, the injured parties were clearly entitled to
recover the $30,000 amount per accident required by the Vir-
ginia statute. Further, the $25,000 single limit policy in Guthrie
fell short of the $30,000 "basic limit" per accident. In Howard,
however, only one person was injured. Assuming that the "basic
limits" in South Carolina were intended to be $15,000 per per-
son, $30,000 per accident, and $5,000 for property damage, How-
ard would have been entitled to recover only $15,000. Thus, the
$35,000 single limit policy would exceed the "basic limit" of
$15,000. Since the court in Guthrie was faced with several in-
jured parties, it easily concluded that any coverage less than
$30,000 was below the basic limits. If only one party had been
injured in Guthrie, the court might well have limited plaintiff's
recovery to $15,000. Additionally, the court's statement that
"the basic statutory limit in South Carolina is $35,000" is mis-
leading. Though the basic limit for a single limit policy may be
$35,000, the basic limits for a split limit policy are $15,000 per
person, $30,000 per accident, and $5,000 for property damage.1 1 4
113. 284 S.C. at 20, 324 S.E.2d at 325.
114. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976). See also Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.,
280 S. C. 149, 155, 311 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1984)(" 'basic limits' coverage is coverage in the
amount of 15/30/5"); Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 280 S.C. 69, 73, 310 S.E.2d 814, 817
[Vol. 37
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The purpose of an uninsured motorist statute is to place a
person injured by an uninsured motorist in the same position he
would have been had he been injured by a motorist covered by a
standard liability insurance policy.115 The uninsured motorist
statutes usually allow the insured to recover up to certain basic
limits, which are those amounts fixed as the minimum liability
insurance required under the financial responsibility laws'" of
the state in which the vehicle operates. 1 7 It has been suggested,
therefore, that "since the injured party could recover no more
than this amount from the tortfeasor's liability insurer, he
should have no greater rights against his own uninsured motorist
carrier.""1 " One commentator has criticized the stacking trend
on the ground that stacking unfairly places the victim of an un-
insured motorist in a better position than the victim of an in-
sured motorist.119 To avoid this result, companies that volunta-
rily issue single limit policies have begun to treat single limit
(1983).
115. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 253 Or. 76, 453 P.2d 164 (1969). See
also Ferguson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 96, 198 S.E.2d 522 (1973); Gunnels v.
American Liberty Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 242, 161 S.E.2d 822 (1968). See generally 7 Am. JuR.
2D Automobile Insurance § 293 (1980); 8C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 101, §§ 5067.65,
5069.
116. South Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act is found in S. C.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to -910 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
117. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 7.1 (1972). S. C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820
(1976) sets the minimum liability insurance amounts at 15/30/5.
118. P. PRETZEL, supra note 117, § 7.1.
119. See Denny, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Present and Future, 52 Va. L. Rev.
538, 552-59 (1966). Regarding the Virginia Uninsured Motorist Act, the author states:
In these cases the courts have looked only to the number of policies availa-
ble to pay the judgment obtained against the uninsured motorist. No thought
has been given to the fact that the act was intended merely to fill, not overflow,
an insurance vacuum. Surely the General Assembly did not intend to foster a
scheme whereby the innocent victim of an insured motorist may be penalized.
It seems more logical that it intended to guarantee a source from which an
insured could recover his damages up to the limits of $15,000/$30,000/$5,000
with respect to any accident.
The pendulum has made the full swing. Before the enactment of the Unin-
sured Motorist Act, one who had taken pains to protect the public against the
effect of his own negligence by carrying insurance was himself unprotected
against the effect of an uninsured motorist. Today that same person, through
his uninsured motorist endorsement, is usually better protected ... if the
wrongdoer is uninsured.
Id. at 555-57 (Emphasis in original).
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policies as if they were split limit policies. 120 In this way the
companies have attempted to limit the recovery to the amount
the insured would have recovered had the at fault motorist car-
ried the minimum required liability insurance. Nationwide at-
tempted to do this in Howard.
In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. McManemy,' 21 the
first appellate decision on this issue, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that an insurer was liable for the full amount
of the single limit of the insured's uninsured motorist policy.
The court reasoned that (1) a contract term that is susceptible
of more than one construction must be construed against the
drafter, and (2) the meaning most favorable to the insured must
be applied even though the insurer intended otherwise. 2 2 The
Safeco decision thus made it "clear that when single-limit unin-
sured motorist coverage is issued, the insurance company may
not then reduce its liability by invoking lower limits established
by the uninsured motorist statute.'
' 23
An insurance company's "use of standard coverage terms
developed for split-limit policies for single-limit coverage argua-
bly creates an ambiguity.' 24 In Howard the Nationwide policy,
which provided for single limit coverage in excess of the section
56-9-820 terms designed for split limit coverage, contained just
such an ambiguity. The court of appeals was correct, therefore,
in allowing recovery from Nationwide up to the single limit of
$35,000 and in permitting stacking of each of the three policies,
since they did not exceed the basic limits. Although the inten-
tion of the South Carolina legislature may not have been to cre-
ate a "basic limit" of $35,000 for single limit insurance policies,
Nationwide's use of these policies created an ambiguity that,
under settled insurance law, should be construed against the in-
surer.125 The Howard court, therefore, would have found a
120. See A. WIDISS, supra note 103, § 2.36.
121. 72 Wash. 2d 211, 432 P.2d 537 (1967).
122. Id. at 213, 432 P.2d at 538.
123. A. Winiss, supra note 103, § 2.36. Several other courts have reached compara-
ble conclusions. See Ohio Casualty Co. v. Berger, 311 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Ky. 1970); State
Farm Ins. Co. v. Edgington, 13 Ariz. App. 374, 476 P.2d 895 (1970). Cf. Lyon v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 310, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).
124. A. WIDISS, supra note 103, § 2.37.
125. The South Carolina courts have repeatedly held that where an insurer prepares
its own contracts, it has a duty to make the meaning clear. If the terms of an insurance
policy are ambiguous, obscure, or susceptible of more than one construction, the terms of
162 [Vol. 37
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stronger basis for its decision in the Safeco line of cases. This
reasoning would have warned insurance companies not to use
coverage definitions developed for split limit policies in an at-
tempt to escape claims under the higher single limit coverage.
Ellisa Catherine Huguley
the policy must be construed against the insurer. See, e.g., Gaskins v. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of S. C., 271 S. C. 101, 245 S.E.2d 598 (1978). See also 8C J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 101, § 5069.
1985]
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